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This paper presents and assesses the recent application of models
in the Real Business Cycle (RBC) tradition to the analysis of the Great
Depression of the 1930s. The main conclusion is that the breaking of
the depression taboo has been a desirable completion of the cliometric
revolution: no historic event should be exempt from a dispassionate
quantitative analysis. On the other hand, the substantive contribution
of RBC models is not yet sucient to establish a new historiography
of the Great Depression.
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1 Introduction
To understand the Great Depression is the Holy Grail of macroe-
conomics (Bernanke (1995), p. 1).
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1So far, for all the bravery of the knights, the quest has proved to be challeng-
ing, and the goal has not yet been fully attained. In the span of almost eighty
years, several theorists have claimed to have clinched the matter. Inexorably,
each time that claim proved to be wrong, or at best partial. Each time new
theoretical developments, or new data successfully challenged the dominant
story. What is more, each time the change in the perspective from which
the economists looked at the Depression signaled a shift in the dominant
paradigm in macroeconomics.
This paper deals with a new stage of the quest. A few years after Eichen-
green's synthesis between the Keynesian and monetarist explanations was
believed to have provided the nal word on the Depression history (Eichen-
green (1992)), Harold Cole and Lee Ohanian brought it all up for discussion
again (Cole and Ohanian (1999), Cole and Ohanian (2001), Cole and Oha-
nian (2004)). In daring to tackle the Great Depression by means of a fully-

edged neoclassical model in the real business cycle (RBC) tradition, they
broke what was perceived by many authors as a taboo (Prescott (2002)).
For the rst time in the history of macroeconomics, an analytical neoclas-
sical model entered the battleeld of the Great Depression, once considered
a theme defying any equilibrium explanation. What is new about the RBC
explanation of the Great Depression? Are we witnessing the emergence of a
new dominant paradigm in macroeconomics? How did the paradigm need to
be amended in the endeavour to tackle the Depression issue?
This paper elucidates the fundamentals of RBC modeling of the Great
Depression. It investigates its origin back in the history of the new classical
revolution, provides some critical thought on its current situations and as-
sesses the roles of economic history and theory in the light of the Depression.
2 RBC models of the Great Depression
2.1 Assumptions and methodology
The RBC research programme stems from the assumption that business cy-
cles can be studied in a framework postulating market clearing and agents'
optimising behaviour (Lucas (1977)). This \equilibrium hypothesis" is cou-
pled with what I shall describe as the \exogenous shock hypothesis", namely
the idea that the origins of economic cycles lie in exogenous shocks to the
fundamentals, rather then being somewhat intrinsic to the economic system.
The joint consideration of these two hypotheses is full of consequences. To
start with, there is nothing inherently bad in business cycles, and they are not
deemed to be sub-optimal. Indeed, in the RBC tradition, the business cycle
2is the optimal response of rational economic agents to unexpected changes
in the economic environment. Consequently, there is no room - nor need -
for stabilization policies implemented by the Government.
A second implication concerns the denition of depressions. RBC re-
searchers think of business cycles in terms of deviation from a dened trend.
Typically, in the analysis of the great depression, the trend is the deter-
ministic growth rate of the economy predicted by the Solow model (Solow
(1956)). To them, a great depression is a `big' business cycle, namely a pe-
riod in which the rate of growth of the economy is suddenly and signicantly
below that which it would have been if the exogenous random shock that hit
the economy had never occurred. In particular, Kehoe and Prescott (2002)
consider that any negative deviation of output from trend qualies as a great
depression, if it satises the following conditions:
1. It should be big enough. Kehoe and Prescott's rst condition is that
output per working-age person should fall at least 20% below trend.
2. It should occur rapidly. Output per working-age person should fall at
least 15% below trend within a decade.
3. It should be long-lasting. Output per working-age person should not
return to trend for a decade.
As is clear from this denition, to Kehoe and Prescott the term `great
depression' is a conceptual category rather than a designation of a particular
historical episode. As a result, other occurrences than the 1930 crisis fall into
the great depression category. These include the Latin American recessions
of the 1980s and the 1990s and the enduring stagnations in Switzerland and
New Zealand since the 1970s. I shall return to this point later in this article.
A third implication of the RBC assumptions concerns the methodology.
If we assume that any economic cycle starts with an exogenous shock, then
studying the specic characteristic of this shock is not necessary for the
task of elaborating a general theory of the business cycle. It is much more
important to understand the regularities that ensue after the shock occurs.
Accordingly, RBC theorists build an articial model economy in the Solow-
Ramsey tradition, and study the reaction of the model to stochastic shocks.
The objective is to make the model economy reproduce the patterns of a
given set of data (Lucas (1980)). If the model reproduces the regularities we
observe in the data under examination, it can be considered to represent a
plausible theory of the cycle.
In order to run these simulations, the structural parameters of the model
must rst be calibrated, that is, a numerical value must be assigned to each
3of them. This is typically done either on the basis of econometric estimates,
or by choosing suitable values to guarantee the internal consistency of the
model.
As to the nature of the shock, the typical shock considered in the earlier,
standard RBC models is a technological one, represented as an autoregres-
sive stochastic shock to the total factor productivity (TFP) (Kydland and
Prescott (1982)). The TFP is a parameter of the production function that
embodies a broad concept of eciency by combining inputs to obtain out-
put.1
2.2 The national dimension of the Great Depression
A controversial feature of the RBC literature on the Great Depression is
its focus on a closed-economy, nation-by-nation analysis. Although the in-
ternational dimension of the Great Depression has long been recognised by
historians as a fundamental trait of the event (Kindleberger (1973) Eichen-
green (1992), Eichengreen and Temin (2000), Temin (1989)), RBC macroe-
conomists have mostly concentrated on idiosyncratic shocks in single coun-
tries in a closed-economy perspective. This is true for the analysis of the
United States (Bordo, Erceg, and Evans (2000), Christiano, Motto, and Ros-
tagno (2004), Cole and Ohanian (1999), Prescott (1999), Weder (2006)),
France (Beaudry and Portier (2002)), the United Kingdom (Cole and Oha-
nian (2002)), Germany (Fisher and Hornstein (2002)) and Belgium (Pen-
sieroso (2007)).
Although such a perspective may be questionable, its rationale is twofold.
First, the initial studies on the Great Depression from an RBC perspec-
tive were strictly concerned with the United States. For the United States
at least, the closed-economy approximation is not too bold an assumption.
Second, the typical RBC model explains recessions by means of a shift in
the labour-demand schedule (Mankiw (1989)). This implies that the in-
ternational dimension need not be the main focus of the analysis. This is
especially true if the gain in terms of data-mimicking from considering an
open-economy scenario are not big enough to make it worth complicating
the model. Parsimony, after all, is a virtue.
1See Solow (1957). Hulten (2000) provides a review of TFP. More recently, other shocks
such as those on taxes, government expenditure, money supply and preferences have been
included in the framework. The inclusion of the monetary dimension in particular has
caused a change in the terminology: nowadays, the label of dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models (DSGE) is preferred to the old RBC denition. In this paper I shall
make no distinction between DSGE and RBC models.
42.3 Main results
So far, the main results of the RBC literature on the Great Depression are
a new dating of the event and a new focus on the recovery aspect, with an
attempt to subvert the accepted historical wisdom about the New Deal.
The traditional view of the Great Depression in the United States and,
by extension, worldwide divides the period into a great contraction and a
recovery phase, with dierent opinions about the speed of the latter (Fried-
man and Schwartz (1963), Romer (1993), Temin and Wigmore (1990)). The
dating results from a simple reading of the data. Considering the data from
peak to trough, the US GDP declined by almost 30% between 1929 and 1933.
From 1933 to 1937, the US economy grew at an average annual rate of 8%,
which became 10% between 1938 and 1941 (Romer (1992)). The division
between a contraction and a recovery phase must have looked self-evident to
many researchers.
But if you consider the very same evidence `through the lens of neo-
classical theory' (Cole and Ohanian (1999)), then the intuitive dating looks
dierent. Detrended output in the United States was far below trend for
a decade. This pattern was common for almost all the countries analysed
within the RBC framework (see Figure 1). If depressions are dened as sud-
den and signicant deviations from the trend, then the obvious conclusion is
that the Great Depression covers the entire 1929-1939 period. No distinction
between a contraction and a recovery phase is therefore made.
A consequence of this denitional change is a shift in the focus of analyses.
As Prescott (1999) points out, the focus on the entire decade shifts the nature
of the question from an explanation of the output and employment drop of the
early 1930s to an explanation of the protracted character of the depression.
In particular, all the negative shocks that may be considered as causes of the
depression were over by 1936. At that date, however, output was still far
below the trend. To solve this puzzle, Cole and Ohanian (2004) advanced
the hypothesis that the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the
National Labour Relations Act (NLRA), two pre-eminent New Deal bills by
President Roosevelt, are to be blamed for the long duration of the depression.
Their argument is that these acts induced cartelization and high wages into
the economy, slowing down the recovery. Their model is able to account for
60% of the lack of recovery in the United States. This explanation is endorsed
by many other economists for the United States (Bordo, Erceg, and Evans
(2000), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004)), and similar analyses have
also been advanced for other countries (Beaudry and Portier (2002)).
According to this view, then, far from dragging the US and the world
economy out of the Great Depression, the New Deal worsened it by changing
5the institutional setup that ruled the labour market in a way that was un-
favourable to business. In a sense, the New Deal may actually have caused
the Great Depression: had the Government not intervened in the market, the
economy would have been back to trend by 1936, or even earlier, if one thinks
that the Great Depression originated from a monetary shock (the Federal Re-
serve started an expansionary monetary policy after the dollar devaluation
of 1933). The Keynesian view is turned upside down: the Great Depression
was not a market failure but a State failure. This vision can lead to a big
change in the historiography of the period.
3 From the great exception to the equilib-
rium Great Depression
The modelling of the Great Depression from a neoclassical perspective might
be a breakthrough for economic history, and it is surely one for economics,
and for macroeconomics in particular.
The Great Depression plays a crucial role in the history of economic
ideas. The perceived inadequacy of contemporary economic theory to explain
the Great Depression motivated John Maynard Keynes to write the General
Theory. With his work, a new discipline now called macroeconomics saw the
light of day. Keynes insisted on the inability of a market system to fully
exploit its potential in the short run, leaving resources idle, and in particular
leaving labour unemployed. He wanted to exonerate price and wage rigidity
from being the obstacle to equilibrium, by stressing the systemic, general
equilibrium nature of unemployment in the short run. Workers, in other
words, were unemployed through no fault of their own. They were ready to
work for lower wages, and still found no job. They were the `involuntary'
unemployed (Keynes (1936)).2 Although in the General Theory the discourse
is at high level of abstraction, it is certain that Keynes was thinking about
the experience of the Great Depression.
The Keynesian approach became mainstream with the interpretative works
by John Hicks (Hicks (1937)) and Franco Modigliani (Modigliani (1944)).
It was challenged by Milton Friedman at the end of the 1960s (Friedman
(1968)), and dethroned by the new classical counterrevolution, led by Robert
Lucas (Lucas (1972)) in the 1970s. The new paradigm was a macro-Walrasian
model based on equilibrium as a methodological premiss. The focus of
macroeconomics gradually shifted away from involuntary unemployment to
2See De Vroey (2004) for an historical and analytical discussion of the involuntary
unemployment concept in macroeconomics.
6business cycle 
uctuations.
Even when the new classical macroeconomics had become the dominant
paradigm, its major authors were still reluctant to apply their method to the
case of the Great Depression. Apparently, there was some perplexity about
tackling a period characterised by mass unemployment such as the Great De-
pression, using a model that starts from the premiss that the world is in equi-
librium. Critics of the new classical macroeconomics, and of its subsequent
evolution into the RBC method, used the Depression case to ercely attack
the equilibrium theoretical perspective (Rees (1970), Summers (1986)). Both
Lucas and Prescott initially answered by taking an `abstentionist' viewpoint
(De Vroey and Pensieroso (2006)): the equilibrium approach to business
cycle was ne for periods of plain sailing, but the Great Depression was
something dierent, possibly calling for dierent explanations (Lucas and
Rapping (1972), Prescott (1983), Prescott (1986)).
While Lucas by and large still sticks to this view (Lucas (1994)), although
with some ambiguity (Lucas (2006)), Prescott changed his mind at the end
of the 1990s and was in
uential in promoting the \Great Depressions of the
20th century" project.
This about-face of the equilibrium school in their attitudes towards the
Great Depression is telling. It shows that the a-priori intuition that an equi-
librium model of the Great Depression is impossible is not so obvious. As Cole
and Ohanian and the other equilibrium macroeconomists participating in this
project have shown, it is possible to build a model based on the equilibrium
premise, and yet to apply it at the interpretation of the Great Depression with
interesting, if controversial, results. But above all, this about-face teaches
us that the equilibrium theory itself has evolved. The new classical macroe-
conomics has progressively broken away from its original purely Walrasian
framework. Nowadays it encompasses imperfect competition, price rigidities
and incomplete markets, all elements traditionally taken into account by the
Keynesian strand of the macroeconomic literature. This evolution towards
what has been dened a `new neoclassical synthesis' (Goodfriend and King
(1997)) has made the theory more suitable for analysing a period like the
Great Depression.
4 An example: Belgium
To illustrate the application of the RBC modelling strategy to the Great
Depression, I shall present some results from my analysis of the Belgian case
(Pensieroso (2007)).
The model is a closed economy populated by an innitely long-living
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In this model, I have assumed perfect competition, rational expectations and
complete markets. I have used a log-log, time separable utility function, with
consumption (c) and leisure (1 l) as arguments. The production function is
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, with esx1  being the TFP. I have detrended
the data by taking the labour augmenting technological progress x out of the
data. The parameter  is the household's discount rate.  is the preference
for leisure in the utility function and  is the capital depreciation rate due
to technical obsolescence and physical disruption. I have assumed that the
detrended TFP, st, follows an AR(1) process with  being its autoregressive
coecient, and vt being a zero-mean i.i.d. innovation.








































plus a transversality condition, where ~ x indicates the detrended x.
Equation (2) is the Euler equation governing savings, or the intertemporal
allocation of wealth. Equation (3) is the standard production-equals-demand
condition, while Equation (4) is the equilibrium between labour supply and
8labour demand. In such an economy there exist a stationary state for all the
detrended variables.
In this model, the transmission mechanism of the shock works as follows.
The productivity shock in
uences production directly. When productivity
decreases, the labour demand decreases as well. If prices and wages are 
ex-
ible, the real wage will decrease, pushing up the real interest rate (remember
it takes time to build, investment today will become productive capital only
tomorrow). This will lower investments. On the other hand, the increase
in the interest rate will make working - and saving - today more attractive
than working tomorrow, thereby increasing the labour supply, and thus re-
inforcing the downward pressure on the real wage. Higher interest rates and
lower wages make consumption decrease. The decrease in consumption does
not match that in output, because the income eect lowers saving as well as
consumption.
The application of the theory to the Great Depression in Belgium consists
of comparing the reaction of this model to a measured TFP shock with the
historical statistics for Belgium in the 1930s. In order to run a numerical
simulation, I need to rst calibrate the structural parameters of the model.








Table 1: Initial calibration of the parameters
It may be instructive to explain how the calibration was done. The param-
eters ,  and  are xed as in Cole and Ohanian (1999). The deterministic
growth rate of the economy 
 is the measured growth rate of the GDP per
capita in Belgium between 1900 and 1994, excluding the two World Wars
and the Great Depression. The parameter  is calibrated so that the hours
worked (l) are 1/3 in the steady state. The autocorrelation parameter  is
calibrated by regressing the logarithm of the detrended TFP (i.e. st in the
model) as an AR(1).
As is customary in this eld, I assumed that the model economy was
in a steady state in 1929. Then, I fed in the residuals from regressing the
logarithm of detrended TFP as AR(1) to represent the unexpected shock vt.
9This means that the shock is measured from the data, making the model
deterministic rather than stochastic.
Figure 2 presents the dynamic response of the model to the shock, and
compares it with the pattern of detrended data. It shows that a standard
RBC model with TFP shock is not a good candidate for explaining the
onset of the Great Depression in Belgium. The Belgian economy entered the
Great Depression in 1930. TFP, on the contrary, stayed at trend - and even
slightly above trend - until 1931. It dropped 10% below trend between 1932-
1934, to stay basically constant thereafter. In the model economy output,
consumption and investments increased until 1931, to decrease only later on,
a pattern at variance with the data.
Quantitatively, the model is able to reproduce about 35% of the 1929-
1934 output drop. It also shows no signs of recovery after 1934, a feature in
accordance with the data. Nonetheless, its overall quantitative performance
is poor, especially as concerns investments and hours worked.
Although the results are mostly negative, the exercise is telling. First, it
shows that it is possible to speak about the Great Depression within a very
stylized equilibrium model. Second, the very failures of the model suggest
what modication are likely to induce a better reproduction of the data. In
the present case, a wedge in the labour market is the most likely candidate.
Accordingly, I modied the previous model to introduce sticky nominal
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0 <  < 1;
t = ln(Mt)   ln(Mt 1);
t   ^  = t








In this model, money is modelled as a choice variable for the agent, who
draws utility directly from holding it. The parameters vt and t are zero-mean
i.i.d. innovations, t is a lump-sum nominal transfer paid by the government
when it issues money, (which in equilibrium must be equal to the seignorage,
mt 
mt 1
(1+t), in order to balance the government budget), and t is the growth
rate of per-capita money stock, which is assumed to follow an AR(1) process,
with ^  and  as given parameters. I assumed complete markets, perfect
competition in the goods market and rational expectations.
I postulated xed labour supply, and a simple nominal wage rigidity  a la
Taylor (1980). Workers are divided into two cohorts, each xing its nominal
contract-wage for two years. The contract scheme is such that, say, cohort
one xes its contract in t for periods t and t + 1, while cohort two xes its
contract in t+1 for periods t+1 and t+2. Then cohort one xes its contract
in period t+2 for periods t+2 and t+3, and so on and so forth. Thus in each
period t, there will be two dierent contracts, one for the cohort which xed
it in period t   1 and one for the cohort which xed it in period t. Calling








When negotiating contracts, agents set them at the geometric mean of the
current average wage and the expected future average wage, as they know
they will not be able to modify the contract in the next period. Moreover,
contracts are dependent on general labour market conditions: the contract
will be positively (or negatively) in
uenced by the hours worked being higher
(or lower) than the steady-state level, when wages are perfectly 
exible and
the labour supply is endogenous.























































































plus a transversality condition.
Equation (9) is the money demand, which turns out to be a function
of current consumption and the nominal interest rate it. Equation (10) is
the no-arbitrage condition between physical capital and money. Equation
(11) gives the rule of formation of detrended real wages ~ w, and comes from
the assumed contract formation in the Taylor set-up. Its role is to pick up
a wage rate, so that the labour demand (Equation (12)) can give us the
corresponding gure for hours worked.
The transmission mechanism of the shock is now dierent from that in
the previous model. A negative monetary shock lowers the price level, via
the real-balance, or Pigou eect: as households expect money to gain value
in terms of the consumption good, they will change the consumption good for
money. Given the sticky-nominal-wage hypothesis, real wages will increase,
which in turns will aect production negatively. Consumption, output and
labour demand will all decrease.
Table 2 shows the calibration of parameters for the monetary model.
The model economy is assumed to be in a steady state in 1929. The
model was simulated after feeding in the series of estimated t. Productivity
shocks were set to zero.
Figure 3 shows the dynamic response of the model to the unexpected
monetary shock, and compares it to the data.
This example shows how detaching the RBC theory from its original
purely Walrasian core has made it possible to fruitfully apply the theory to
the Great Depression event. The improvement that the inclusion of `Keyne-
sian' elements such as sticky nominal wages into the analysis brings about is
huge and self-evident. In particular, the behavior of investments and hours
worked is better accounted for. The overall fall in the detrended data between











Table 2: Calibration of the parameters to include sticky nominal wages and
monetary shocks
5 Open issues
As highlighted above, the production of a fully-
edged neoclassical model
of the Great Depression is a denite breakthrough. An earlier self-imposed
restraint has been removed, a testimony to the resilience and adaptability
of the RBC methodology. This new stream of research has tried to provide
new answers to old questions. In the process, it has sometimes rephrased the
questions themselves in terms more congenial to its theoretical apparatus.
However, the new approach also raises new questions. A rst point that
deserves to be made concerns the plausibility of the closed-economy analy-
sis. It is undeniable that the closed-economy perspective makes the model
easier, often with no or minor losses in terms of data mimicking ability.
Nonetheless to overlook the obvious international dimension of the Great
Depression sounds like a signicant limitation of the scope of the analysis,
not least because the model has nothing to say about real and nominal ex-
change rates, the current account and other trade-related variables. As the
new open macroeconomics is currently making considerable progress (Lane
(2001)), new research in this area is to be expected. The comparison of the
results from this new research with the work of leading scholars of the Great
Depression will, I am sure, be most intriguing.
The second point worth discussing is the eective contribution that the
RBC models of the Great Depression have brought about in terms of our
knowledge of the period. In other words, if we leave aside the important
methodological innovation, have we learned anything new about the Great
Depression from the RBC models? Alas, the answer is currently a qualied
`no'.
Models using exogenous TFP shocks to account for the depression con-
13tribute little to our understanding. TFP, once labelled `the measure of our
ignorance' (Abramovitz (1956)), is denitely a poor concept for historic anal-
ysis. In other words, to rephrase the question of the origin of the Great De-
pression in terms of TFP variations, and then study its quantitative impact
in a fully-
edged neoclassical model is certainly an important methodolog-
ical contribution. But, as aptly noticed by Temin (2008), it adds little if
anything, to the impressive historical literature on the theme.
Even from a methodological viewpoint, the claim that the predictive abil-
ity of a theory is the litmus test by which its validity ought to be judged is
far from self-evident. Such a claim can nd some justication in Friedman's
renowned methodological stance: as complete realism of hypotheses is clearly
impossible, the question of whether a theory is realistic enough should be
settled by seeing whether it yields predictions that are accurate enough for
the case at hand, or at least better than competing assumptions (Friedman
(1953)). Although Friedman did not have exogenous TFP shocks in RBC
theory in mind, Prescott's argument that `a theory of technological change
is not needed to predict response to technological change' (Prescott (1986))
is an extreme, possibly unintended ospring of Friedman's methodological
position. Be that as it may, Prescott's standpoint does not withstand closer
examination. As Summers pointed out, the history of human thought is
full of plainly wrong theories, that still delivered good predictions: Ptole-
maic astronomy and Lamarckian biology are good example of this (Summers
(1986)).
As to the claim that economic policies like the NIRA and the NLRA
slowed the pace of the recovery, the claim is interesting, and its formalization
useful. Still, the claim is hardly new. Several authors have already proposed
it, starting with Keynes (1933) and Simons (1934) in the 1930s, and mov-
ing on to Hawley (1966), Lucas and Rapping (1972), Weinstein (1981) and
Eichengreen (1992) in the post-war era.
All this is not to say that the eort has been useless, nor to dismiss the
entire research project. The quantitative dimension of the RBC analysis
will be crucial for anyone wanting to speak about the Great Depression in
the future. The impressive pile of data that has resulted as a by-product
of this research project is also valuable per se. There are signs that the
new approach may lead to a general shift of focus in the analysis (from the
cause of the slump to the cause of its long duration, for instance), and to a
new assessment of the New Deal as well. For the time being, however, the
equilibrium approach to the Great Depression has still to prove his worth in
terms of substance.
Another controversial issue concerns the denition of what Kehoe and
Prescott call `great depressions of the 20th century' (Kehoe and Prescott
14(2002), Kehoe and Prescott (2008)). Before their intervention, no economist
apparently felt that a denition of `great depression' was really needed. To
all intents and purposes, the term was used to designate one single episode,
the world-wide crisis of the 1930s. The fact that the latter was somewhat
dierent from, and bigger than any other crisis was taken for granted - hence
the `great' modier and the use of capital letters to denote the event (the
Great Depression). By contrast, RBC authors think of great depressions as a
conceptual category, dened in quantitative terms. What is striking in their
denition is that it pays little attention to the obvious dierences among
dierent historic events. The following example illustrates this point.
Figure 4, shows the detrended output per working-age person for the
United States during the Great Depression of the 1930s and compares this
with data for New Zealand and Switzerland during what Kehoe and Prescott
call a great depression in the 1970s. For the purpose of comparison, I have
also plotted the undetrended real GDP per capita in PPP in Figure 5. Two
facts are immediately evident. First, the detrended output drop was far more
rapid during the U.S. depression in the 1930s than during those of the 1970s.
Second, if we look at the undetrended data only, there is no evidence of Kehoe
and Prescott's so called `great depression' in New Zealand and Switzerland.
There was no signicant and protracted contraction in real GDP in those
countries that is remotely comparable to that observed in the United States
in the 1930s. They simply grew more slowly than expected from a simple
extrapolation of a 2% linear trend.
The major 
aw in Kehoe and Prescott's denition is that it is too all-
encompassing. It mistakes the stagnations of the 1970s for depressions. Ap-
parently, something peculiar happened during the Great Depression, which
Kehoe and Prescott's denition does not catch. Although more research on
this theme is desirable, this denitional pitfall also casts some doubts over
the capability of the RBC approach to provide a new dating of the Great
Depression.
6 History and macroeconomics
The Great Depression of the 1930s was once an uncontested realm of eco-
nomic history. With the appearance of RBC models of the Great Depression,
a territorial dispute may arise, with the two approaches clashing over issues
of method and substance. I do not think this is either inevitable or desir-
able. As I shall discuss in this section, the two approaches are complementary
rather than alternative.
As well as being an obvious consequence of the circumstances under which
15macroeconomics was born as a discipline, the fascination the Great Depres-
sion holds for macroeconomists is part of a renewed interest in economic
history in general (Goldin (1995)).
The parallel advances in the collection of historical data and in macroeco-
nomic modelling have suggested the use of history as the kind of laboratory
experiment long lacking in macroeconomics. Nowadays, growth theory is
successfully being applied in a century-long perspective, trying to explain
the shift from the low growth rates of the `Malthusian' regime, to the high
growth rates of the modern era (Galor and Weil (1999), Hansen and Prescott
(2002)). Cole and Ohanian have started the same vogue for business cycle
theory, by applying it to the explanation of the Great Depression. Historical
macroeconomics is an exciting new eld, where models can be tested in a
`controlled' environment, in a feverish search for better explanations.
In this respect, the breaking of the Depression taboo is denitely a great
feat. For better or worse, the Great Depression will be a powerful test of the
theory, and it might still deliver the new insights on the event that so far are
missing. Moreover, as Ohanian (2000) put it once, there are many stories of
the Great Depression: models help to assess whether a particular story holds
water.
The other side of the coin is that models are based on exclusions. It
may be that the excluded factors are crucial in the explanation of the single
event at hand. This may be true even if the model produces a good ex-post
`prediction' of the fact. The reason is that to explain a fact is not necessarily
the same as to build a model that reproduces a fact.
A good example of this limitation of the modelling strategy is my analysis
of the Great Depression in Belgium. As I have shown above, the introduction
of negative monetary shocks coupled with nominal wage stickiness helps the
model to account for the 1929-1934 evidence. In no way, however, does it
explain what caused the slump. The monetary shock, indeed, was the result
of the exchange rate regime Belgium stuck to, the Gold Standard, coupled
with the devaluation of the British pound in 1931. All this information is
in a sense meta-theoretical, as it is outside the model, and stems from the
work of historians (Cassiers (1989)). Nonetheless, we need to refer to it, if
we want to make sense of the model.
To conclude, for all the novelties they have brought about, the substantive
contribution of RBC models is not yet sucient to amount to a historiogra-
phy of the Great Depression.
167 Conclusions
The Great Depression of the 1930s is again at the forefront of economic
research. Several RBC models of the Great Depression have been advanced
since the pioneering work by Cole and Ohanian (1999), who, for the rst
time dared to frame the Great Depression within the accepted canons of the
equilibrium business-cycle theory.
This was a step forward in macroeconomics, in that an earlier self-imposed
restraint was overcome. It shows that there are no a-priori limits to the scope
of the modelling strategy either in economics, or in economic history. This
can be seen as a completion of the `cliometrics' revolution.
At the same time, the unimpressive results so far obtained by RBC
economists, together with the enduring methodological concerns about the
application of RBC theory to the Great Depression call for some caution, es-
pecially when deriving historical interpretations and policy implications from
the analysis.
Macroeconomic models are a ne test for historians. In particular, their
formulation in quantitative terms will force historians to enter the quantita-
tive discourse, probably to the mutual benet of both macroeconomists and
historians. This does not mean that traditional story-telling will cease to be
a necessary tool for obtaining the broad picture of history.
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Figure 1: Detrended output during the Great Depression in Belgium, France,
Germany and the United States







































































Figure 2: A comparison of the results of the RBC model with TFP shock
(blue) and the actual data (red)





































































Figure 3: A comparison of the RBC (DSGE) model with monetary shock
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Figure 4: Detrended output data comparing the Great Depression in the
1930s in the USA with the situation since the 1970s in Switzerland and New
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Figure 5: Undetrended output data for the USA during the Great Depression
and for Switzerland and New Zealand since the 1970s. Source: De Vroey and
Pensieroso (2006)
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